Modelers of cognitive processes have been identified as belonging to one or the other oftwo camps: inhibitophiles or inhibitophobes (see chap. 15, this volume). Therefore, it seems reasonable to make clear our points of view on the issue that underlies this volume, namely, what is the proper role of the construct of inhibition in cognitive theory? David S. Gorfein falls into the inhibitophobic camp, whereas Vincent R. Brown admits to inhibitophilic tendencies but with several caveats. Brown suggests that honest inhibitophiles 1. see if they can account for your results without inhibition; 2. then make sure they haven't implicitly snuck inhibition into their model; and 3. to the extent that their model uses inhibition, ask whether it really is cognitive inhibition.
1. see if they can account for your results without inhibition; 2. then make sure they haven't implicitly snuck inhibition into their model; and 3. to the extent that their model uses inhibition, ask whether it really is cognitive inhibition.
As a subscriber to the principle ofleast effort, Gorfein is struck by the extraordi nary difficulty of inhibiting anything once it has been activated. Anecdotally, he remembers a day in the mid-1960s when he was lecturing on classical conditioning and in particular on the work of Razran (1935) with respect to salivary conditioning in human participants. He had just made the point that in an effort to avoid satiation from the mints commonly used as unconditional stimuli in salivary conditioning, Razran had experimented with saying "saliva" as t unconditional stimulus to his participants. This assertion aroused furi us han aving by one of the students, who rose to say that the whole idea was ridiculo and that no one need salivate to the word saliva-at least, that was her intent, but she found herself spitting instead of talking because she had a mouth full of saliva she could not control. In short, the activation of a single word result in a bodily response that was outside the control of any potential inhibitory mechanism.
Investigators of a wide variety of cognitive tasks have identified the process of determining meaning for the single word as a basic unit for studying every thing from list and paired-associate learning and memory (e.g., Melton & Martin, 1972) to the highly complex processes associated with human communication (e.g., Gernsbacher, 1990) . Although these studies have provided substantial insight into human cognition, only a few models have offered a mechanism that might serve to integrate the individual areas (e.g., the spreading-activation theory of Collins & Loftus, 1975 , as well as the ACT model of J. R. Anderson, 1983) . A purpose of this chapter is to examine the evolution and applications of the activation-selection model (ASM) of meaning selection (Gorfein, 2001a; Gorfein, Brown, & DeBiasi, in press; . This model aims to account for a variety of meaning selection data without explicitly postulating inhibition between alternative meaning representations.
Although we credit the origins of ASM to Gorfein and Bubka's (1989) chapter, the impetus of the work can be traced to earlier work on what is called proactive interference or proactive inhibition (PI) in the short-term memory distractor task (J. A. Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959) . Gorfein and Viviani (1981) made use of nonhomophonic homographs such as minute Cmi-nct, a unit oftime, or mr-tnut, extremely small) and showed that meaning selection influenced proactive interference by producing release from PI when the meaning context was changed on the trial following the presentation of the homograph (for a description ofthat work, see Gorfein, 1987, pp. 162-165) .
In this chapter, we begin with a review of a portion of the literature on the process of meaning selection for ambiguous words and in particular the effect of such selection on subsequent encounters with the same ambiguous word. Ambiguity resolution is a useful place to study meaning selection, in that unlike tapping into the nuances of words, the results of such processing are relatively easy to see. We then describe ASM and review data from our own laboratory on ambiguity processing. Finally, we complete the circle by offering a little evidence and some speculation as to how ASM can be related to episodic memory processes.
On Proposals for a Role for Inhibition in the Processing of Lexical Ambiguity
A major impetus to the idea that the selection of an appropriate meaning of a homograph leads to the suppression of the inappropriate meaning came from the cross-modal priming studies of Onifer and Swinney (1981) . Earlier work using the lexical decision task had indicated that a homograph presented in the absence of a biasing context could serve as a prime for words related to either meaning. Two things were special about the cross-modal study: (a) Even a highly constraining context related to the dominant meaning of a highly polarized homograph resulted in the immediate priming of words related to both the dominant and the secondary meaning of the homograph in a lexical decision task, and (b) words related to the dominant meaning were still primed 1.5 seconds after the presentation of the homograph, but words related to the secondary meaning were not. This mechanism leading to the eventual selec tion of a single meaning was labeled suppression by Swinney (1981) , and Gernsbacher (1990) developed it into a theory of ambiguity processing as part of her structure-building theory. Gernsbacher and Faust (1991a , 1991b reported that skilled readers showed the pattern of initial activation of both meanings of an ambiguous word followed by decreased activation ofthe context-inappropriate meaning, whereas unskilled readers showed activation for both meanings across the interval following an ambiguous word, typically 1,300 to 1,400 milliseconds in their studies. This result has been used as the basis for the claim that poor readers are less able to suppress the inappropriate meaning. Alternatively, Perfetti and Hart (2001) showed that poor comprehenders initiated the activation of word meaning later than good comprehenders, so this delay in onset could account for the observed difference in persistence of activation for the less skilled comprehenders-they simply start later.
Simpson and Kellas (1989) reported that once a homograph had been used as a prime for a word related to one of its less common meanings (e.g., bank as a prime for river), even after a lag of 12 intervening trials, a target word related to the dominant meaning of the homograph (e.g., bank followed by money) showed a prolonged naming time relative to a neutral baseline. Simpson and Kang (1994) extended the idea oftemporary suppression of the nonselected meaning of an ambiguous word to an inhibitory process that endured over a period of time. In similar fashion, Gorfein and Walters (1989) reported that for non homographic homophones (e.g., sun and son), when a participant had filled in the blank in a sentence designed to bias the secondary (less frequent) meaning of the homophone (Like father, like s_ _), an increased probability ofthe response son was observed on a spelling test administered 24 hours later. Gernsbacher, Robertson, and Werner (2001) reported that for sentence sensibility judgments, there is a large cost of changing the meaning of a homo graph on consecutive sentence trials. Participants were slower and less accurate in deciding that "She blew out the match" made sense on Trial n + 1 after deciding on Trial n that "She won the match" was a sensible sentence. In contrast to the cost found in the naming task used by Simpson and Kang (1994) over 12 intervening trials, Gernsbacher et al. found that after four intervening sentences, there was no cost associated with the meaning change, but there was a benefit when meaning was maintained (e.g., when the target sentence on Trial n + 5, "She blew out the match," was preceded on Trial n by the sentence, "She lit the match").
There is considerable agreement by a number of investigators that the amount of suppression or inhibition that will result from the selection of a homograph meaning will depend on the amount of competition between the two meanings (i.e., with balanced homographs eliciting greater competition). Both Simpson (Simpson & Adamopolous, 2001 ) and M. C. Anderson (Shivde & Anderson, 2001 ) endorsed such a hypothesis, and it is implicit in recent attempts to model M. C. Anderson's retrieval-induced inhibition view (Norman, Newman, Detre, & Polyn, 2006) . However, direct tests of this hypothesis are lacking.
In summary, these studies support the view that although contextual support for one meaning is present at the initial processing of an ambiguous word, the context-inappropriate meaning is available as well, as shown by the priming of words related to the context-inappropriate meaning or meanings (Onifer & Swinney, 1981) . Activation of the context-inappropriate meaning falls quickly to baseline, whereas activation ofthe context-appropriate meaning persists (Gernsbacher & Faust, 1995; Perfetti & Hart, 2001) . Once a meaning is selected, however, the long-term effects of such selection are a matter of dispute. Simpson and his colleagues (Simpson & Adamopolous, 2001; Simpson & Kang, 1994; Simpson & Kellas, 1989) showed a cost with respect to the context-inappropriate meaning and a lack of benefit for the context-appropriate meaning at long intervals. In contrast, Gernsbacher et al. (2001) showed bene fits of maintaining the same meaning over long intervals but no cost when meanings were altered. Explanation of these apparently conflicting outcomes is crucial to distinguishing between transient suppression and longer lasting inhibition. Finally, Simpson and Adamopolous (2001) made, but did not directly test, the theoretical prediction that the magnitude of the effect of processing depends on the degree of conflict that exists at the time of processing; that is, contextual constraints may either reduce or enhance the conflict, depending on the degree of dominance of the homograph meaning as well as the strength of the contextual constraints.
Theory
A number of theories or frameworks have been offered to explain the process of meaning selection, but few have provided the detail necessary to make precise predictions of the outcomes of a wide variety of experiments. We briefly describe some of these with respect to the focus of this volume-the place of inhibition in cognition:
• Structure-building framework (Gernsbacher, 1990) . Gernsbacher pro posed two processes; one is activation of memory that enhances the activity of words that fit the activated meaning, and the second is active suppression of meanings that do not fit the context. Suppression is a transient process decaying in a matter of seconds.
• Negative priming (Simpson & Adamopolous, 2001; Simpson & Kang, 1994) . To the extent that competing meanings occur when an ambiguous word is processed, the requirement to ignore the competing meaning results in relatively long-lasting negative priming through the inhibi tion of the competing meaning.
• Independent-activation model (Twilley & Dixon, 2000) . Twilley and Dixon (2000) explicitly acknowledged that their independent-activation model, which also postulates a suppressive meaning-selection mecha nism, can fit the effects of local contextual constraint (priming) but cannot produce the results of studies like those of Simpson and Kang (1994) that show decrements due to meaning change over the lag of several intervening trials. They suggested a change in the resting levels in their model as a possible modification but have not explored the viability of this solution.
• Interactive activation and competition (lAC) model (Erickson & Allred, 2001 ). Erickson and Allred (2001) believed that their lAC model shows promise in explaining priming costs and benefits over short intervals, although the model does not yield effects beyond one or two interven ing trials.
• Retrieval-induced forgetting model (M. C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995) .
The extension of this memory model suggests that the active retrieval of one meaning of an ambiguous word (e.g., by using memory retrieval cues related to that meaning) will tend to inhibit the alternative mean ings of that word (see Shivde & Anderson, 2001 ).
• Reordered-access model (Duffy, Kambe, & Rayner, 2001; Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988) . Each meaning of a given word has two primary sources of support: the relative frequency of each meaning determined by prior experience and information provided by the current context. Like ASM, this model does not explicitly include an inhibitory mechanism. A main goal of this model is to show that although context does have an influ ence on performance, it cannot completely override a strong frequency based bias toward one meaning. A formal implementation of this model based on the constraint satisfaction architecture of Spivey and Tanen haus (1998) provided a specific mechanism for predicting decision times as a function of weights representing the contextual support for both the meanings of an ambiguous word and the baseline frequency of occurrence of each meaning. As currently specified, this model does not have an explicit mechanism for accounting for long-term effects of meaning selection over many intervening trials or long time intervals. However, modifying the constraint satisfaction implementation of the model so that the weights representing the frequency of each meaning retain their altered values following meaning selection may give it the flexibility to account for some of the observed long-term effects.
• Activation-selection model (Gorfein et al., in press ). Presenting a word for processing activates attributes associated with its meanings. The meaning of a word is a consequence of those attributes of a word that are active. Selecting a meaning for any word results in a reweighting of the attributes of the word toward the meaning selected. The process ing of ambiguous words is a fertile field for the testing of this model.
The Activation-Selection Model
ASM was developed with the intent of explaining long-term effects of meaning selection. Typically, experiments in our laboratory show the effects of meaning selection over periods from 1 to 20 minutes and, on one occasion, over 24 hours. Further, we have demonstrated transfer of meaning selection across a variety of tasks. The effects of meaning selection persist even when the nature of the task is altered from initial meaning selection to testing. The following are six principles of the activation-selection model:
1. Words are represented by a weighted set of attributes (e.g., Bower, 1967 ). An attribute is a hypothetical construct for representing the various (semantic, contextual, graphemic, acoustic, etc.) features asso ciated with a word.
2. The initial processing of a word activates a small number of attributes; the number is determined by task constraints and the processing time available. 3. Attributes are activated in proportion to their current weight. 4. The set principle is as follows: Processing a word in the context of an active attribute results in selection of that attribute whenever the current word possesses the active attribute as one of its features, and this selection results in an increment to the activation of the selected attribute, resulting in greater activation than for an attribute activated under Principle 2. 5. Activation of an attribute decays exponentially to a resting level as a function of the initial strength of activation. 6. When a meaning is selected, the weights of active attributes associated with that meaning are increased. Incrementing the weight of an attri bute has the effect of increasing the likelihood that that attribute will be activated on subsequent encounters with the word. With respect to ambiguity processing, the reweighting of the selected attributes is the primary means by which one can account for the long-term effects of meaning selection, which produces results such as those for homophone word association cited in the previous section (Gorfein & Walters, 1989) .
Principles 1 to 4 explain normal priming. A prime stimulus (sentence, word, or picture) activates a number of attributes associated with the meaning of the prime. If an ambiguous stimulus is presented in the presence of these active attributes, its interpretation will be biased to the extent that the active attributes overlap with the attributes associated with one of the alternative meanings of the stimulus. In addition, Principle 6 leads to the prediction that accessing the meaning of an ambiguous word in the context of a word related to one of its meanings will, as the result of changes in the attribute weights, bias multiple subsequent encounters with the word toward that meaning (see the discussion later in this chapter ofV. R. Brown, Gorfein, & Amster, 2005) .
Testing the Consequences of the Activation-Selection Model
In reviewing the differences between studies that showed long-term costs asso ciated with homograph disambiguation (for reviews, see Bubka Gorfein, 2001b; Simpson & Kang, 1994 ) and the sentence study in which costs were obtained only on an immediate trial (Gernsbacher et al., 2001 ), we were immediately struck by the fact that on the test trials in the sentence study, the homograph was always preceded by the disambiguating context (the homographs had been placed last in the sentence, as in other studies that used postsentence, related words to measure meaning priming). According to ASM, local context will tend to dominate under these constraints, because it activates attributes associated with a particular meaning (i.e., the set principle). The reordered-access model would seem to make similar predictions, because the early portion ofthe sentence creates a contextual bias toward a specific mean ing. This is exactly the condition that should be most effective in overcoming the effects of previous priming. Other models would in all likelihood make similar predictions, but the need to distinguish between transient suppression and a more enduring inhibition mechanism suggested that we test the hypothe sis directly.
To test the hypothesis that the effect of the meaning change in the sentence data had been hidden by the contextual constraint, we rewrote the second occurrence sentences! to place the ambiguous word before the disambiguating context. In a between-groups design, we tested the original sentences and the rewritten sentences with four items separating the prime and test sentences. For the original sentence order (homograph at the end of the sentence), no effect of meaning change was obtained. In contrast, when the homograph preceded the disambiguating context, large costs were observed when the mean ing of the sentence changed between the two trials (Gorfein, 2002) . These findings are similar to the effects that Simpson and his colleagues (Simpson & Adamopolous, 2001; Simpson & Kang, 1994; Simpson & Kellas, 1989 ) re ported and are consistent with the view that there are long-term costs associ ated with changing the context-appropriate meaning.
Gorfein and Amster (1998) studied homograph repetition with same or altered meaning in the relatedness decision task, a task in which the participant is required to decide whether a pair of words presented successively are related (e.g., roof and beam). When the homograph occurred first in the second occurrence (target) pair (e.g., beam and laser), the effect of meaning change was almost double that of the condition in which the related word preceded the homograph in the target pair (e.g., laser and beam). (This study is discussed again in greater detail later in this chapter.) ASM makes the claim that the effect of meaning change results from a readjustment of the weights of a word's semantic attributes. Although we have not yet found a direct way to test this claim, we have consistently found that meaning selection effects persist across tasks as well as temporal intervals. As early as 1962, Segal demonstrated transfer from analogy processing to word association. When a homograph was presented as part of an analogy, the meaning engendered by the analogy affected the choice of meaning for the homograph in a subsequent association test. In a recognition memory test, Light and Carter-Sobell (1970) showed that when an adjective biased one meaning of an ambiguous noun at study (e.g., traffic paired with jam) but a different meaning at testing (e.g., grape and jam), there was a significant decrease in recognizing the noun (jam). Balota (1983) reported a related experiment involving transfer from a lexical decision task to a recognition memory task. Priming in the lexical decision task was essentially equal for threshold and suprathreshold presenta tions of the prime. With respect to recognition memory, however, repetition of the prime produced a benefit in the suprathreshold group but not in the thresh old group. Balota interpreted his results to mean that lexical activation in the absence of being able to read the masked prime was insufficient for directing the attentional resources required to encode the prime. Later in this chapter, when we discuss how the activation-selection model applies to episodic memory (memory for specific past experiences), we offer our own explanation of these results and propose a test of that explanation.
In our laboratory, we have reported transfer from generating homophones using a word-fragment completion task (sometimes called a cloze procedure) to spelling and word association to that homophone (Gorfein & Walters, 1989) and from a picture location task to the spelling of, and word associations to, homophones (Gorfein et aI., in press ). In a single study, transfer was obtained from picture-location memory of homographs to sentence-sensibility judgment, word association, relatedness decision, short-term memory, and free recall (Gorfein, Black, & Edwards, 2005) . Transfer from sentence-sensibility judg ment to relatedness decision was also found in an independent study (Gorfein, 2002) . Because environmental context varies across tasks in these studies, it is our beliefthat these findings argue against an episodic-retrieval explanation oftransfer, because theories such as Logan's (1988) episodic-retrieval view are dependent on contextual consistency. In a similar fashion, the reduction of contextual retrieval cues resulting from response changes make Neill and Valdes's (1995) episodic-retrieval explanation of negative priming inapplicable to the transfer effects obtained in these studies.
Testing the alternative models of homograph processing was the goal of two studies conducted in our laboratory, one using homographs (Gorfein, Berger, & Bubka, 2000) and the other using homophones (Gorfein et aI., in press ). Both studies demonstrated that even after participants had responded in the direc tion of the dominant meaning in a context designed to elicit the dominant meaning, they reverted to an earlier primed secondary meaning on a subse quent test of the ambiguous word in an unbiased context. In the study of homophone processing (Gorfein et aI., in press), we made use oftwo dependent measures to ensure generality of the conclusions: homophone spelling and word association to homophones. Because the two measures yielded highly similar results, we describe only the results for the combined measures.
For a normative baseline, a voice tape was prepared containing 42 homo phones and 23 nonhomophones in random order. This tape was then presented to participants, half of whom were told to write the first word to come to mind to the auditory word and half of whom were to spell the word they heard. Performance on the two tasks was highly correlated, and the combined mean proportion of dominant responses was .74. This value was used as a baseline for two other studies.
In the first study, we compared the efficacy of pictures representing the homophone versus the printed word as cues for the disambiguation of the auditory presentation ofthe homophone. The homophones were presented four to a page with one homophone-presented either as a picture or as a word in each quadrant of the page, making a booklet of 11 pages (Figure 6 .1 shows a sample page). Participants were told that they were being tested on their memory for the location (quadrant) on the page and for whether the word was presented as a picture or as a word. The experimenter read aloud the four words on each page as the participant looked at the booklet. A memory test followed in which the experimenter read the 44 homophones in random order and the participants endeavored to recall location and form of presentation (word or picture). The tape recording used in the normative study was then introduced. Half of the participants were told to write the first word to come to mind for each word presented, and half were told to write what they heard ("spell the word"). Priming of the secondary meaning was greater for pictures (mean proportion of dominant responses =.52) than for words (mean proportion of dominant responses = .61), and both were significantly below the mean dominance of. 74 in the normative group. From the viewpoint of the experimenter, the second and critical experiment had three parts. Phase 1 was a picture-word orienting phase similar to that described in the preceding paragraph. It was followed by Phase 2, an auditory word-association or spelling task in which the critical homophone was preceded by a prime related to the dominant meaning of the homophone (e.g., Item n is star and Item n + 1 is sun). In this portion ofa continuous list, three homophone conditions were randomly presented: those shown in Phase 1 as pictures, those shown in Phase 1 as words, and those not shown in Phase 1. Without a break, this tape was completed with Phase 3: The same 69-item voice tape used in the normative and baseline studies presented the homophones in a nonbias ing context. Figure 6 .2 shows the combined results for the location memory study and the final two phases of the current experiment-Phase 2, with homophones in a dominant biasing context, and Phase 3, with the same items presented in the absence of a biasing context among the last 63 items of the list. As can be seen, items came out of the orienting phase much less likely to be responded to in the dominant direction than was the case in the normative control. How ever, in the dominant biasing context of Phase 2, the items were basically back at baseline except for the control condition, which showed priming in the direction of the dominant meaning as expected. The data from Phase 2 can be viewed as consistent with suppression-inhibition theories in that performance in the picture and word conditions was below the control condition, indicating that the initial secondary priming in the orienting phase served to reduce the effect of the Phase 2 dominant prime. According to suppression-inhibition theories, it is necessary to inhibit or suppress the Phase 1 tendency to respond toward the secondary meaning resulting from the Phase 1 experience. In Phase 3, performance moved back toward the secondary meaning (below base line), especially in the case ofthose items presented as pictures in the orienting phase. Such a recovery and movement away from the normative baseline is in our view incompatible with inhibition models as a class: Long-term inhibition of the secondary meaning carried over from Phase 2 would seem to lead to a smaller proportion of secondary responses in Phase 3, and short-term suppres sion that does not carry over would seem to predict a return to baseline perfor mance in Phase 3. However, most suppression-inhibition models have not been specified in sufficient detail to attempt a direct fit to these data. We have simulated the data shown in Figure 6 .2 using an algorithm based on the principles of ASM outlined earlier in this chapter. Figure 6 .3 presents the results of our simulation, which are clearly consistent with the Figure 6 .2 data. To the extent that the simulation fits the data, the question remains whether we have somehow "snuck" cognitive inhibition into the model. That question is addressed in chapter 14 in this volume.
It is the increase in the weights of attributes associated with the selected meaning of an ambiguous word (Principle 6) that provides the basis for the ASM's explanation of the data presented in Figure 6 .2. In Phase 1, the picture stimuli are seen to be more effective primes for the secondary meaning of the homographs than are the words. In ASM, this is represented as the activation of a greater number of secondary attributes in response to the pictures than to the words that visually accompany the auditory presentation of the homo phones. The weights of the secondary attributes activated by the picture and word primes in Phase 1 are increased as the participant uses the prime to disambiguate the homophone. These more strongly weighted secondary attri butes are in turn more likely to be selected when the homophone is presented again in Phase 2, this time following a word priming its dominant meaning. This procedure leads to slightly more secondary responses (fewer dominant responses) compared with the control condition in Phase 2. Although the domi nant Phase 2 prime and subsequent dominant responses lead to an increase in the weights of the activated dominant attributes, the weights of the secondary attributes remain unchanged from their Phase 1 level. (The weights of a few secondary attributes actually increased in Phase 2 to the extent that they contributed to the proportion of secondary responses observed in Phase 2).
Thus, when the homophone was presented again in a neutral context in Phase 3, the balance of attribute weights was still tipped in the direction of the secondary meaning primed in Phase 1 relative to a control condition that was not subject to secondary priming. This process leads to the observed in crease in the number of secondary responses in the neutral Phase 3. This shift is particularly apparent for the homophones primed by pictures in Phase 1, because the more effective picture prime caused the weights of more secondary attributes to be increased. The long-term effect of prior meaning selection observed in Figure 6 .2 is explained by ASM apparently without assuming that the representations of the competing primary and secondary meanings of the homographs inhibit each other in any way.
Because the reordered-access model also does not postulate direct inhibi tion between meaning representations, it should be considered whether that model could account for the long-term effects depicted in Figure 6 .2. A modified version of the constraint-satisfaction implementation of the model, which allows the weights representing meaning frequency to remain altered following meaning selection, may be able-in a manner similar to the ASM-to account for the return of responses in neutral Phase 3 toward the initially selected secondary meaning. That is, if the revised frequency weights following second ary meaning selection in Phase 1 are sufficiently altered and the reweighting is not largely reversed by the dominant decision in Phase 2, then the frequency weights may be sufficient to return the Phase 3 responses back in the direction of the secondary meaning. The exact behavior of the modified model would depend, among other things, on the way in which the proportion of responses is determined by the model (which is currently designed as a model of process ing time).
As we noted earlier in this chapter, a prediction of suppression-inhibition models is that the greater the conflict between meanings at the point of disam biguation, the greater the need should be to suppress the context-inappropriate meaning. For homographs where the two meanings are balanced (i.e., the frequency of each meaning is close to 50% in word association norms), eye tracking studies indicate that there is maximal conflict (as measured by gaze duration) when the homograph occurs prior to its disambiguating context in a sentence (Duffy et al., 1988) . Therefore, for suppression-inhibition theories, this finding suggests that were the balanced homograph to occur prior to a related word in a relatedness decision task and subsequently to be disambigu ated by the related word, the inhibitory effect of meaning selection on a later encounter with the same homograph would be maximized. When the related word precedes the homograph on the initial encounter, little competition should exist, and therefore there should be little need to suppress or inhibit the alterna tive meaning.
The opposite prediction is made by ASM. The attributes of a related word that overlap with that meaning of the following homograph will be activated (the set principle), and to the extent that more attributes of the appropriate meaning are activated, the impact of their reweighting will be greater on fu ture occurrences of the homograph. Thus, ASM predicts that related word homograph pairs should produce both greater benefits and greater costs than homograph-related word pairs (although, again, suppression-inhibition mod els predict that first-occurrence homograph-related word pairs should produce greater costs of a homograph than related word-homograph pairs at the second presentation).
We tested that hypothesis in a relatedness decision experiment. In a within-subject design, the first occurrence of a homograph was in one of two orders: related word-homograph or homograph-related word (V. R. . Figure 6 .4 reports the order of the outcomes for reaction time, and Figure 6 .5 shows the results for accuracy. The effects of order of the priming pair are consistent with the predictions of ASM. When the related word precedes the homograph, the related word acts as a prime that preactivates attributes re lated to that particular meaning of the homograph. This process leads to an increase in the number of attributes reweighted when that meaning is selected, which in turn increases the likelihood of the same meaning being selected on a later presentation of the homograph. Thus, benefits are obtained when the subsequent presentation is of the same meaning, whereas costs are obtained when the subsequent presentation is in a different meaning context.
Priming and the Activation-Selection Model
In a more formal analysis of our model, we examined how the probability of the dominant meaning being selected affected the number of attributes of the secondary meaning initially activated. We based our analysis on the parameters used in the Gorfein et al. (in press) study, where to select a meaning, a simple majority of sampled 19 attributes was needed (i.e., 10 or more attributes). The result of calculations based on the binomial distribution shown in Figure 6 .6 indicates that as the probability of a dominant response increases from 0.5 to 1.0, there is very little diminution in the mean number of secondary attributes selected, with a mean of six secondary attributes still obtained atp(dominant) = .95 and falling below four only when p(dominant) > .99. Inasmuch as ASM assumes that forward priming is a consequence of active attributes, this sug gests little diminution of secondary priming as dominance increases. Such a finding is consistent with the lexical decision priming of secondary meanings across a wide expanse of homograph balance (e.g., Simpson & Burgess, 1985) . 
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Application of the Activation-Selection Model to Episodic Memory
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, in this section we complete the circle from episodic memory, especially short-term memory (Gorfein, 1987) , to ambiguity processing and back to some data and speculations about how ASM can contribute to an understanding of episodic memory. To apply ASM to episodic tasks in general and short-term memory in particular, we add three principles to the model:
7. The amount of activation given attributes is partly a controlled process. 8. Context (stimulus sample; Estes, 1950 ) is attached to active attributes at the time of encoding. Active attributes at encoding are marked with a sample of the contextual features present at encoding. 9. The context at retrieval is used to evaluate items presented for recogni tion or to aid in recall.
Muter (1980) used a task that paralleled in structure the standard Brown Peterson short-term memory task (Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959;  i.e., ready signal, brief presentation of subspan materials to be remembered, filled retention interval and test). Participants who processed the materials without memory instructions showed a complete loss of those materials on an unexpected memory test at a 2-second retention interval, in contrast to participants under memory instructions, who showed a decline in performance to about 20 seconds, at which point the function reached a nonzero asymptote. Muter interpreted his results as indicating that participants engaged in surrep titious rehearsals when alerted that later recall was expected (see Crowder & Greene, 1987 , for a discussion ofthe import of this finding). However, there is an alternative view to the meaning of these results based on Principle 7, and we believe that the alternative has much greater predictive power. It is clear that the rehearsal hypothesis would predict that in well-practiced participants, one of the following outcomes would be observed in the Muter (1980) study: Either there would be no retention interval effect because rehearsal-proficient participants would overcome the effects of retention inter val, or (more likely) the effect of retention interval on performance would be that typically observed in distractor tasks-that is, performance would decline as a function of retention interval, because it would be easier to rehearse for shorter than for prolonged intervals. Alternatively, under Principle 7 of ASM, it might be possible for a participant to adjust activation so as to minimize PI. The question then arises as to what the ideal adjustment might be. According to ASM, the model performance depends on being able to use the context at the time of recall both to help in retrieving the item from memory and in evaluating the retrieved item as to whether it was the one most recently presented. To the degree that the item is still active in memory, the retrieval step might be bypassed. However, evaluation depends on the similarity ofthe contextual features initially encoded with the item and the contextual features present at the time of retrieval. To the degree that more than one item shares these features, successful retrieval becomes more problematic. Thus, if an item's attributes are still active when the next item is presented for study, the set principle suggests that the active attributes of the earlier item will select those attributes that the two items have in common, thereby creating potential difficulties (competition) at a subsequent retrieval attempt. Further, consistent with Principle 4 of ASM, the activation that is the consequence of the set principle will be incremented, making it more difficult for the participant to control activation, and thereby will tend to ensure that the item on the next trial will be similarly encoded. Before fully discussing the consequences of this view, we describe an experi ment that supports these claims. Gorfein and Viviani (1980) used a procedure similar to that of Loess (1968) : Word triads drawn from taxonomic categories such as animals or clothing were used as memory items. The experiment consisted of 18 blocks of 4 trials each, arranged so that within a block all items came from the same category, and categorical blocks were arranged so as to maximize the judged semantic dissimilarity between adjacent blocks. We reasoned that when retention intervals vary at random across trials, as is 
Serial Position in Block Figure 6 .7. Number of words correct out of three as a function of trial position in a block and whether the retention interval was fixed or variable (from Gorfein & Viviani, 1980) . typical in short-term memory studies, the participant can do little to adjust activation to maximize performance. If the retention interval is fixed in dura tion, however, the participant can work to maximize performance. We therefore created three conditions: a typical manipulation in which the retention interval was either 6 seconds or 15 seconds, varied at random, and two fixed interval conditions, a pure 6-second and a pure I5-second condition. Counter to the rehearsal prediction-that performance would decline with increasing length of retention interval-we expected performance on the fixed 6-second interval to be the same as that of the fixed I5-second interval. When the retention interval was randomly arranged, we reasoned that the best the participant could do would be to adjust activation to an intermediate level, which would result in better performance at 6 seconds and poorer performance at 15 seconds. As shown in Figure 6 .7, those results are exactly what we obtained.
In the context of episodic-memory experiments, we sought to determine how the principles of ASM would apply to the finding of Balota (1983) that recognition memory was influenced only when a prime word at study was suprathreshold. In applying Principle 9 to the question, we suggest the possibil ity that the participant may on some trials compare the contextual markings of the prime and the homograph to help decide whether the homograph was previously presented. Two possibilities come to mind. First, in the absence of awareness of the priming word in the lexical decision task (i.e., the threshold condition), the participant may fail to undertake this comparison in the recognition task. Or, second, under the threshold activation of the prime word, the participant may fail to attach a contextual sample to the activated attri butes of the prime. A way to test these possibilities may exist. If participants perform both a threshold and a suprathreshold lexical decision task followed by the recognition task for the combined set of items, we might expect partici pants to use the contextual comparison task for the combined set. To the extent that the threshold primes were contextually encoded, we would expect a similar advantage for same-meaning primes. Ifthe threshold primes were not contextu ally marked, then the results would be similar to those of Balota (1983) that is, a differential effect of threshold and suprathreshold primes but under circumstances in which we could be confident that the comparison was undertaken.
In the past several years, we have begun to try to connect ASM to the memory literature (V. R. Brown & Gorfein, 2004 and in particular to ideas that suggest a memory process based on two types of memory traces: verbatim and gist traces (Brainerd, Payne, Wright, & Reyna, 2003; Brainerd, Reyna, & Mojardin, 1999 ; see also chap. 10, this volume).
It is our belief that the two trace types represent the effect of encoding mechanisms similar to those proposed for ASM. The verbatim trace dominates when a significant majority of contextually encoded attributes of an item are unique to the item in the memory context. This happens when there is little overlap between the item's attributes and the attributes of other items pre sented within the memory context. On Trial 1 in the Brown-Peterson task, performance is at ceiling regardless of the duration of the retention interval, because there are no other items to share the current contextual encoding. In similar fashion, when care is taken to maximize the dissimilarity of adjacent category blocks in this task, the first trial of a block will show no effect of retention interval (compare performance between the 6-second and IS-second retention intervals on Trial 1 in Figure 6 .5).
From our viewpoint, the gist trace dominates whenever there is significant overlap between the attributes activated for closely spaced items (close spacing maximizes contextual similarity) and the overlap in attributes diminishes the effectiveness of the verbatim trace. When attributes of successive items are selected under the set principle (i.e., the active attributes of a prior item select the current item's attributes), they ensure a commonality of contextual mark ing. Although it is highly probable that when lion and tiger are presented on successive trials, animal will be part of the current activated sense of each word, and it is only under the following circumstances that a gist trace will result. Common attribute marking has three potential sources: (a) Context does not fluctuate greatly between the independent occurrences of the common attribute, resulting in highly similar encoding; (b) the active attribute animal from the word tiger presented on an earlier trial is still active when lion is presented on a later trial, resulting in both attributes being marked with the context of the later trial; or (c) the presentation of the word lion on a later trial brings tiger back to mind and thereby leads to common encoding. In this regard, Rundus (1971) showed that it was not uncommon for a later word in a free-recall list to bring back into the active rehearsal set an item presented earlier in the list that had dropped out of the rehearsal set.
To the extent that a participant in a Brown-Peterson task could control the activation of the current memory item, performance would be enhanced if the activation ended at the time of retrieval or recognition. Activity to that point would guarantee the presence ofthe memory trace ofthe current item and therefore make retrieval relatively easy. However, to the extent that activation persists until the next item, the set principle becomes operative as described above (i.e., overlapping attributes tend to remain active from item to item). When common attributes remain active, it becomes difficult to constrain the activation ofthe current item, because under Principle 4 of ASM, an increment in activation is automatically applied to a selected attribute or attributes. We are currently investigating the circumstances that allow the control of activation. One line of our investigation is considering the possibility that the reason high-memory-span individuals show less PI is that these individuals are more able to control activation. (For a fuller discussion of memory span, see chap. 7, this volume.)
Conclusion
We believe that the ASM outlined in this chapter can account for the process of selecting the meaning of an ambiguous word without requiring the suppres sion or inhibition of the unselected meaning. In ASM, a word is assumed to be represented as a collection of abstract attributes. Each attribute of an ambiguous word is assumed to be associated with one of the alternative mean ings. The meaning associated with the majority of active attributes is the meaning selected for a given occurrence of the word. The relative balance of the alternative meanings is assumed to be dynamic: Each time a meaning is selected, the attributes associated with that meaning are increased in weight. Because the probability of an attribute being activated is proportional to its weight, this change in an attribute's weight has the effect of biasing future occurrences of the ambiguous word in the direction of the recently selected meaning. The strength of a word's representation does not return to some baseline level after each experience. This finding accounts for long-term effects such as the primacy effect shown in the location memory task and in prior work with the continuous word association task (Gorfein et a1., 2000) .
Despite an intervening dominant prime, participants in the location mem ory task who were initially primed with the secondary meaning of a homograph made a greater proportion of secondary responses to the homograph in a neutral context many minutes later compared with control participants not initially exposed to a secondary prime. Suppression-inhibition models would seem to have difficulty explaining how the activation of the secondary meaning can continue beyond the subsequent dominant prime, which by definition would lead to the inhibition or suppression of the secondary meaning. Lingering inhibition would cause the proportion of secondary responses to remain below the control condition during a subsequent encounter with the homograph in a neutral context, whereas transient suppression might allow the proportion of secondary responses to return to the level of the control condition. In neither case, however, should the proportion of secondary responses increase above the control condition in the subsequent neutral context, as the data indicate and as ASM predicts. (As discussed in this chapter, it is possible that a modified version of the reordered-access model, which also does not postulate inhibition or suppression of the nonselected meaning, could account for these data, but that remains unclear at this point.)
In addition, the ASM view has implications for the processing of words in situations ranging in scope from semantic memory tasks such as sentence sensibility instructions to episodic-memory tasks like the Brown-Peterson par adigm. Furthermore, the addition of contextual stimulus sampling at encoding connects ASM to two-process memory models such as fuzzy-trace theory. Thus, in the future we hope to show that ASM is part of a broader theory of cognitive processing that does not assume that selecting among conflicting representa tions necessarily requires a mechanism that suppresses the unselected alternative.
